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ABSTRACT
As part of the research into the causes of war, 
different opinions have developed over the impact public 
opinion can have on the conduct of war. To explore this 
question, this paper examines the role played by public 
opinion in the Vietnam war through three different 
paradigms of public opinion (the force, constraint, and 
enabling condition models) and Daniel C. Hailin's 
hypothesis that public opinion regarding the Vietnam war 
was created by the president when he sent clear messages 
through the media. The three models and Hailin's 
hypothesis were used to explain data produced by six events 
during the Vietnam war and how they were reported during 
the conflict. It was discovered that the role of public 
opinion depends upon the event since no one model could 
explain all six events. Also, Hallin's theory was found to 
be limited in that, though a high level of agreement 
between public opinion and the media's reporting was 
identified, the president was unable to guide the media in 
all situations. The results demonstrate that the search 
for the causes of war and the role of public opinion in 
such events is far from complete.
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PUBLIC OPINION AND STATE POLICY
CHAPTER I 
PARADIGMS OF PUBLIC OPINION
The author's first formal introduction to the study of 
international relations was in the pages of Walter S.
Jones' The Logic of International Relations.1 As is 
standard with such texts, Jones' work covers many of the 
problems and issues faced by those who seek to understand 
human behavior in this field. One of these questions is a 
riddle that has plagued social scientists since the dawn of 
civilization: What are the causes of war?
In one chapter, Jones examines fourteen seperate 
theories of the causes of war, each with its own merits.*
In his estimation, the most "comprehensive theory" amongst 
these explains war as a tool of conflict resolution.3 In 
this theory war "is a rational instrument of decision, and 
war policies are decided by a logical computation of costs 
and benefits."* Though Jones does not delineate this 
"rational" decision making process, a model of the "logical 
computation" that takes place in the mind of the statesman 
can be constructed through the works of Benjamin J. Cohen 
and Geoffrey Blainey.
In his search for the causes of imperialism (which he 
treats as identical to the phenomenon of war), Cohen claims
2
3that since the current international aystem is 
characterized by competitive* sovereign states* the 
"rational** behavior for a state "is to broaden its range 
of options--to aaxiaize its power position."0 Without 
attempting to determine the nature of power* Cohen proceeds 
to explain that power is accumulated through the simple 
process of gaining "influence" or "dominance" over others* 
which then allows the state to control the range of options 
available to its rivals.6 One way in which influence and 
dominance can be attained is through the tool of war.
However* war is useful in this regard only if it 
indeed increases a state's power position. Blainey 
discovered in hie analysis of all wars from 1700 to 1971 
that war occurs only when a state believes it can "gain 
more by fighting than by negotiating."7 In making this 
determination* he claims that a statesman will consider 
seven different factors which guage a state's ability "to 
impose Cits! will on the rival nation;" one of these 
factors is public opinion* both foreign and domestic.•
Though Blainey includes public opinion as an important 
consideration* he fails to explain exactly how public 
opinion can affect the conduct of war. Others* however* 
have tried to do so. In their works* Joseph A. Schumpeter* 
Thorstein Veblen* Raymond Aron* and Edmund Silberner reach 
various conclusions about the role of public opinion in 
armed conflicts.
4PUBLIC OPINION AND WAR:
Both Veblen and Schumpeter suggest that modern public
opinion is ill-suited to the purposes of statesmen
attempting to carry out war policies and, thus, will tend
to act as a restraining factor in such matters. In the
words of political economist Claude Ake, Schumpeter
believes that the imperialistic (or war) “impulse** derives
its source “from the habits and instincts that moulded
peoples and classes into warriors under pressure of the
struggle for survival and supremacy.**9 However, Schumpeter
also indicates that “individualism and democratisation** as
specific “modes of thought and action associated with the
capitalist mode of production*' will cause the modern world
to turn away from such "non-rational" activitea as
warfare.10 Veblen views the influence of modern society in
a similar fashion. He states that “subservience of the
community" to war policies can only be maintained with
great effort against the “disentegrating influenceCs) of
modern life."11 The influences that Veblen is concerned
about are to be found in industrial society,
where the machine industry constantly enforces 
the futility of personal force and prerogative in 
the face of wide-sweeping inanimate agncies and 
mechanical process, and where the ubiquitous 
haggling of the price system constantly teaches 
that every man is his own keeper.10
Essentially, both Schumpeter and Veblen contend that “the
interests and ways of thought which the diffusion of the
industrial system Cwill) spread among the masses" will
5eventually change the attitudes of the public by leaaening
the “will to conquer" and the "will to power" and,
therefore, reduce the likelihood of war.1*
The exact oppoalte of thla view la held by many,
Including Aron, who dlacount the arguaenta of Veblen and
Schumpeter and view the public aa open to war aa It ever
waa. Aron atatea:
The dealre for collective glory, the pride of 
participation In national greatneaa, even aa one 
of the loweat of cltlzena or aervanta, may well 
aurvive In the age of cannona, akyacrapera, and 
underground atatlona adorned with marble.1*
Aa evidence of thla, he auggeata that the "mlliterlam of
the maaaea" haa given the world a "cult of violence" which
can cauae "charismatic leadera of popular factions Cto be]
driven farther by the delirium of power than are the
inheritors of the feudal spirit. . . ."1S> In this view,
public opinion can easily become a tool for the marshalling
of the resources of the state for war.
Finally, Silberner takes a more cautious approach and
concludes that "the economic and social evolution of
mankind" will produce public opinion that can take both
hawkiah and pacifiat stances.16 After examining in detail
several different schools of thought on the peaceful or
warlike tendencies of public opinion, Silberner found no
sufficiently convincing argument. Speaking aa only a
social scientist can, Silberner atatea that an
understanding of the role of "pacific tendencies" and "the
6forces making for war depanda on each particular situation 
that la being examined."17 Silberner'a anawer to the 
question of how public opinion affects the conduct of war 
can be abbreviated to the aimple statement: It dependa.
It would aeem, then, that there are different opiniona 
about the appropriate place of public opinion in the 
strategic calculations of atateamen. To find an anawer to 
thla question, a widely accepted method la to conduct an 
empirical atudy in which the researcher aelecta a 
particular war (about which extensive and accurate data 
exiat) and then analyzea specific events in that war to 
discover the part played by public opinion. Such a method 
ia employed in this paper through the careful atudy of the 
Vietnam war.
two q u e s t i o n s:
There are innumerable aspects of the relationship 
between public opinion and the US government in the Vietnam 
war that can be studied. But the primary concern here ia 
the impact that public opinion had on the management of the 
war. In addition, in light of the work of the authors juat 
mentioned above, it la important to include an examination 
of the source of public opinion in the event. Therefore, 
it ia neceaaary to find answers to the following questions: 
How did public opinion affect the US government'a conduct 
of the Vietnam war? and What waa the source of public 
opinion regarding this event?
7The first, question seeks processes by which public 
opinion influences the formulation and implementation of 
policy. From an examination of the works of several 
scholars who have studied these processes, it is apparent 
that at least three different paradigms have been and are 
being used to describe the impact of public opinion on 
government policy: the force, constraint, and enabling 
condition paradigms.
PUBLIC OPINION AS FORCE:
Public opinion has often been conceived of in a manner 
which suggests the action of one billiard ball striking 
another. In the force model, public opinion appears in the 
political environment, collides with existing government 
policy, and alters it--much as one ball hits another on the 
table and, therefore, changes its direction of motion. 
Examples of the use of this paradigm can be found in the 
works of Alexis de Tocqueville and George F. Kennan.
In his Democracy in America Tocqueville suggests that 
republics cannot well engage in large, extended projects in 
the face of obstacles, particularly in matters of foreign 
policy. Tocquevilie's argument seems to rest on the belief 
that the public does not have the necessary skill. He 
claims that the public simply **has little capacity for 
combining measures in secret and waiting patiently for the 
result.”1* He almost seems to suggest that citizens of 
republics simply lack the 'knack' for deceit. This
8deficiency atema from the republican citizen'a lack of 
proper education In the peculiarltlea of international 
political
Experience, morea, and education almoat alwaya do 
give a democracy that aort of practical everyday 
wiadom arid underatanding of the petty buaineaa of 
life which we call common aenae. Common aenae ia 
enough for aociety'a current needa, and in a 
nation whoae education haa been completed, 
democratic liberty applied to the atate'a 
internal affaira bringa bleaainga greater than 
the ilia reaulting from a democratic government'a 
miatakea. But that ia not alwaya true of 
relationa between nation and nation.
Aa a reault of thla, a republic tenda "to obey ita feelinga
rather than ita calculationa and to abandon a long-matured
plan to aatiafy a momentary paaaion. • .
Thia ia the point at which he breaka into the force 
paradigm. Momentary paaaiona (apparently hia term for 
deeply felt public opinion) appear in the midat of 
complicated plana and knock them off courae. Public 
opinion aimply puahea the government about almoat according 
to whim. Clearly, then, Tocqueville perceivea public 
opinion aa a force— one with which the government muat 
reckon if it ia to attempt to maintain any conaiatency at 
all in ita foreign affaira.
Kennan haa alao uaed the force paradigm in hia work. 
One obaervation that Kennan makea about republica ia that 
they will produce erratic behavior in mattera of foreign 
affaira. Specifically, he claima that aa an aaaembly (in 
thia caae Congreaa) becomea involved in the foreign policy
9making proceaa, foraign policy itaelf bacomea erratic.
Thia effect ia produced by the influence of domeatic
advocatea on the deciaion making proceaa. In hia book The
Cloud of Danger, he atatea:
Congreaa ia, unqueationably and inevitably, more 
vulnerable than ia the Executive branch, and the 
State Department in particular, to preaaurea from 
ethnic and other organized lobbiea or minoritiea, 
anxioua to influence foreign policy to the 
advantage of their varioua parochial aima and 
concerna. The examplea of thia are ao numeroua 
that it would be auperfluoua, perhapa even
invidioua, to cite any aingie one of them.*1
Later in the book he claima:
When thia aort of thing occura, it aimply meana 
that the power of our government to act upon ita 
international environment ia being abuaed and 
diatorted for domeatic-political purpoaea, with 
the reault that our actiona on the external acene 
tend to become, aa expreaaiona of national 
policy, incoherent and either ineffective or 
aelf-defeat ing•
He deacribea thia effect rather vividly by deacribing auch
a atate in "the foreat of international eventa Caa] a man
with aome aort of muacular affliction, obliging him to
perform purpoaeleaa and aelf-defeating movementa.
Aa doea Tocqueville, Kennan clearly deacribea public 
opinion aa a force. Varioua intereat groupa, with their 
varioua opiniona on different queationa, place preaaure 
upon Congreaa and puah it to adopt certain policiea. The 
government, in effect, geta knocked about like a billiard
ball after the break.
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PUBLIC OPINION AS CONSTRAINT:
Another way to conceive of public opinion ia the 
constraint aodel. Under thia paradigm, public opinion 
becoaea an anchor which holda back the ahip of atate. In 
caaea auch aa thia, the public'a preferences prevent the 
government from selecting specific policy 
alternativea— action ia not altered but prevented. An 
example of the uae of thia model can be seen in Immanuel 
Kant'a book Perpetual Peace.
The critical argument Kant makea in this book ia that
republics are more reluctant to engage in war than other
forma of government. He auggeata that war will aimply
ceaae to be a viable option for foreign policy under
republican conatitutiona due to pressures from public
opinion. Kant explains:
If, aa ia inevitably the caae under thia 
[republican] constitution, the consent of the 
citizena ia required to decide whether or not war 
ia to be declared, it ia very natural that they 
will have great hesitation in embarking on ao 
dangerous an enterprise. For thia would mean 
calling down on themselves all the miseries of 
war. . . . But under a constitution where the 
subject ia not a citizen, and which ia therefore 
not republican, it ia the simplest thing in the 
world to go to war. For the head of atate is not 
a fellow citizen, but the owner of the atate, and 
a war will not force him to make the slightest 
sacrifice ao far aa hia banquets, hunta, pleasure 
palaces and court festivals are concerned
In brief, Kant believes that republics are more 
peaceful due to forces that “rely for their effectiveness 
upon man's desire to pursue his self-interest and his
11
desire to survive"— forces that have the effect of 
reatraining the government. Republics are leaa likely to 
engage in war because the public's extremely negative 
opinion of war acts as a weight pulling the option down, 
making its implementation difficult if not impossible. 
PUBLIC OPINION AS ENABLING CONDITION:
The third and last way of explaining how public 
opinion can influence policy fits what may be referred to 
aa the enabling condition paradigm. In thia model, public 
opinion neither altera nor prevents action by the 
government but makes action poaaible--much as the soil 
makes possible the growth of a plant. Public opinion 
provides the political environment in which government 
policy can thrive. The public does ao by merely making the 
implementation of the policy possible, not by directly 
supporting the policy alternative itself. Both Niccolo 
Machiavelli and Walter Lippmann make use of this last 
paradigm in describing the impact of public opinion on 
foreign policy.
Machiavelli'a book The Prince is an instruction manual 
for the new ruler. In it he states that rulers who are 
supported (which includes a measure of respect or fear) by 
their subjects will have a freer hand in foreign affairs 
than those who are loved or hated by their subjects. In 
the chapter on cruelty he states:
Men are less concerned about offending someone
they have cause to love than someone they have
12
cause to fear. Love endures by a bond which sen, 
being scoundrels, nay break whenever it serves 
their advantage to do so; but fear is supported 
by the dread of pain, which is ever present.0*
On the subject of being hated, he clearly indicates 
its disadvantages in the chapter on the utility of 
fortresses:
Not to be hated by his subjects is the best 
fortress a prince can have. If the people hate 
him, a fortress will not save him, for when the 
people take up arms against him they will never 
lack for foreigners to succor then.07
On the other hand he clains that the prince who enjoys 
the support of the people "will be able to stand alone" and 
that "all near hin Cwill be] disposed to obey hin."00 In 
support of this Machiavelli cites the exanple of the 
Spartan king Nabis who was able to sustain "attack fron the 
whole of Greece and fron a triunphant Roman arny as 
well."00
It is obvious then, as it surely was to Nabis, that a 
prince who is supported by the people will be better able 
to carry out foreign policies without fear of losing his 
crown. Other princes will be restricted since they nust 
guard against foreign aided rebellions and conspiracies.
But note that the support of the people does not include 
support for any policy alternative: it nerely grants 
obedience to the ruler, naking the inplenentation of policy 
possible. Therefore, the support of the people becones an 
enabling condition which enpowers the prince.
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Lippmann aakaa uae of the paradiga in a alailar 
fashion. In deacribing governmental policy making, he 
makea the claim that, theoretically, governments have more 
flexibility in the conduct of their foreign affaira than 
they may have in other apherea of policy. Essentially, 
Lippmann claima that the public ia severely underinformed 
and does not readily feel the effect of foreign eventa.
This is so mainly because "Ci3n foreign affairs the 
incidence of policy ia for a very long time confined to an 
unseen environment."3a He also suggests that it is the 
case that, *'Ct3he [political] environment must be confined 
within the range of every man's direct and certain 
knowledge.,,3t If thia is the case, then "CtJhe field of 
democratic action is a circumscribed area," and beyond that 
area ia a field on which public opinion haa no 
preferences.30 Therefore, since foreign affairs is beyond 
the range of direct and certain knowledge (which also means 
beyond the experience of the public), public opinion on 
foreign policy will be limited or even non existent. 
Logically, then, Lippmann concludes that governments will 
have the ability to move with relative ease in foreign 
affaira:
Those programs are immediately most popular, like 
prohibition among teetotalers, which do not at 
once impinge upon private habits of the 
followers. That is one great reason why 
governments have such a free hand in foreign 
affairs.33
14
In thia case, public opinion (or the lack thereof) 
allows the governsent to take actions it deems proper and 
necessary in pursuit of the national interest. Again, 
support ia not offered for any particular policy; various 
policy options are merely permitted by the public to exist 
on the range of viable alternatives without interference. 
SOURCES OF PUBLIC OPINION:
The second question listed enquires into the source of 
public opinion in the Vietnam war regardless of how it 
influenced particular events. It has recently and commonly 
been suggested that the president provides the public with 
its opinions in foreign affairs, especially in matters of 
war and peace. In his book The “Uncensored War**: The Media 
and Vietnam. Daniel C. Hallin states in reference to 
President Lyndon B. Johnson's eventual reaction to the Tet 
offensive in the Vietnam war: Once the president acted, the 
public seemed to follow his lead, as it usually does in 
foreign policy.3* Johnson could not, however, "lead" the 
people on his own. Since the administration could not 
communicate with the people directly, it had to be done 
through the media (hence the term). Once the media 
reported the president's position, the public then 
responded.
However, he points out later in book that,
(w)hen the administration fails to provide a 
clear direction, the media (begins] to become 
more active. . . . CW]ith officials divided and 
communication channels within the administration
15
inoperative, the media Cbecomes3 a forum for 
airing political differences rather than a tool 
of policy.3®
Implicit in thia statement (and explicit in hia comment on
Johnson's reaction to the Tet offensive) is the claim that
when the president was clear, public opinion was guided by
the media. However, when the president failed to
communicate his positions clearly to the media, then the
media as a "tool of policy" broke down. Taken as a whole,
thia is what happened in the Vietnam war. Hallin explains
in the conclusion of his book:
The behavior of the media . . .  is intimately 
related to the unity and clarity of the 
government itself. . . . This is not to say that 
the role of the press is purely reactive. Surely 
it made a difference, for instance, that many 
journalists were shocked both by the brutality of 
the war and by the gap between what they were 
told by top officials and what they saw and heard 
in the field, and were free to report all this. 
But it is also clear that the administration's 
problems with the "fourth branch of government" 
resulted in large part from political divisions 
at home, including those within the 
administration itself, which had dynamics of 
their own. In a aenae, what is really 
remarkable, as CMcGeorgel Bundy observed, is that 
the press and the public went as far with 
American policy in Vietnam as they did.3®
From this logic, it can only be assumed that events 
in the Vietnam war which negatively affected public opinion 
had their impact because the administration did not clearly 
indicate to the media which interpretation to use.
Hailin's "hypothesis" also seems to suggest that an 
administration should, if it wishes to have public support 
at the start of a project, prepare public opinion prior to
16
the initiation of policy. Such efforts are aade when 
presidents attempt to introduce the idea of an action (i.e. 
drop hints) long before anything is actually done. 
RegardlessP in seeking the source of public opinion in the 
Vietnam war, Hallin essentially claims that public opinion 
was created by the president when he sent clear messages 
through the media.
AN EMPIRICAL TEST:
Now that three different paradigms of public opinion 
and Hailin'a hypothesis on the source of public opinion in 
the Vietnam war has been examined, the only remaining task 
ia to apply these tools to specific events in the war. The 
substance of six events encompassed in the war is the 
subject of the second chapter.
17
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CHAPTER II 
PUBLIC OPINION AND THE VIETNAM WAR
Table 1 presents an abbreviated chronology, derived 
from a history by John E. Mueller, of the Vietnam war from 
1954, the year in which President Dwight D. Eisenhower 
offered aid to South Vietnam, to 1971, the end of which saw 
a drastic scaling down of United States military efforts in 
the country. During the war, several events occurred which 
affected the course of the conflict in ways which stand out 
from the rest**-either because of the magnitude of their 
impact or because of the unique forces involved. This 
chapter examines six of these events and their 
relationships to contemporary public opinion.
Specifically, these events include Eisenhower's offer 
of aid to South Vietnam on 25 October 1954; Johnson's draft 
call on 28 July 1965; a set of three withdrawals ordered by 
President Richard M. Nixon on 8 June, 16 September, and 15 
December 1969; the February 1966 Senate hearings on US 
involvement in South Vietnam; the Tet Offensive launched on 
30 January 1968; and the US invasion of Cambodia in May 
1970. Certain events in this list also share more in 
common than may be readily apparent. The first three 
events provide examples of the government acting under the
19
TABLE 1
CHRONOLOGY OF VIETNAM WAR 1954 - 1971
7/21/54 Geneva accorda end Indochina war between French 
and Communist-led guerrillas
10/25/54 President Eisenhower offers aid to South 
Vietnamese government
2/12/55 United States advisers take over training of 
South Vietnamese army from French
10/23/55 Diem becomes president of South Vietnam
1958 Growth of Viet Cong guerrilla war against 
government of South Vietnam
11/8/60 South Vietnamese government charges North 
Vietnam is infiltrating troops into South 
Vietnam
11/10/60 Revolt of South Vietnamese paratroopers against 
Diem fails
Fall/61 Decision by Kennedy Administration to increase 
military and economic aid to South Vietnam, 
raise numbers of military advisers from 685 to 
several thousands
10/9/62 Diem says war against Viet Cong now going well
10/2/63 Defense Secretary McNamara predicts most of the 
14,000 United States military personnel in 
South Vietnam can be withdrawn by the end of 
1965
11/1/63 After months of internal political and 
religious turmoil, Diem ousted from office and 
killed in coup
11/22/63 Kennedy assassinated; Johnson becomes president
12/21/63 McNamara abandons plan to withdraw by end of 
1965, notes gains of Viet Cong after Diem coup
(TABLE 1 CONTINUED)
3/17/64
8/64
11/3/64
2/7/65
2/24/65
2/27/65
3/8/65
4/2/65
4/17/65
5/65
6/21/65
7/28/65
United States pledge of continued assistance to 
South Vietnam as long as required to control 
"Communist aggression"; warnings to North 
Vietnam repeatedly issued
In response to two firings on American ships in 
Gulf of Tonkin, North Vietnamese PT boat bases 
are bombed; Congress passes resolution 
supporting action and other such measures to 
protect United States forces and "prevent 
further aggression"
Johnson reelected president
North Vietnam bombed by United States planes in 
retaliation for Viet Cong attack on United 
States bases in South Vietnam
United States planes bomb Viet Cong targets in 
South Vietnam for first time
State Department White Paper on aggression from 
the North
Marines land in South Vietnam to defend United 
States base
United States to increase troops in South 
Vietnam, increase air strikes
15,000 demonstrators in Washington protest 
bombings; teach-ins follow
Five-day suspension of air raids
Ky becomes premier of South Vietnam
Johnson announces increased draft calls to 
allow buildup in Vietnam from current 75,000 
to 125,000
12/24/65 Month-long bombing halt begins
(TABLE 1 CONTINUED)
2/66
4/12/66
6/29/66
9/11/66
12/66
2/67
4/15/67
9/3/67
10/21/67
11/67
1/30/68
2/28/68
3/1/68
3/22/68
3/31/68
4/3/68
Senate hearings on war in Vietnam
First B-52 raids over North Vietnam
Extension of bombing raids to oil dumps near 
Hanoi
Elections in Vietnam for constituent assembly
Reports from North Vietnam by New York Times 
correspondent on civilian damage caused by 
United States air strikes
Wilson-Kosygin probes for negotiations on war; 
North Vietnam continues to demand unconditional 
bombing halt before talks can begin
Mass antiwar rally of 100,000 in New York
Elections of Thieu and Ky in South Vietnam
Antiwar demonstrators storm Pentagon
Bunker-Westmoreland visit to United States, 
voice optimism on war
Beginning of major offensive by Communists 
during Tet cease-fire
Military requests 206,000 more men
McCarthy gets sizeable vote in challenge 
to president in New Hampshire primary
General Westmoreland removed as commander in 
Vietnam and promoted
Johnson declares partial bombing halt, calls 
for talks, announces he will not run for 
reelection
North Vietnam agrees to preliminary peace talks
(TABLE 1 CONTINUED)
4/9/68
5/68
10/31/68
11/6/68
Spring/69
6/8/69
9/16/69
10/69
11/15/69
11/16/69
12/15/69
4/20/70
5/70
2/71
Spring
6/13/71
Defense Secretary Clifford announces policy of 
549,500 troop ceiling and gradual transfer of 
war responsibility to South Vietnam
Further Communist offensives
Full bombing halt agreed to, "productive 
discussions" to be begun
Nixon elected president
Communist offensives
Nixon announces beginning of troop withdrawals:
25,000 by August
Nixon announces withdrawals of 35,000 more men 
as pace of war slackens
Nationwide protests against the war
Mass antiwar march in Washington
Reports of civilian massacre by United States 
troops in March 1968 at Mylai
Nixon announces further withdrawal of 50,000
Nixon pledges to withdraw 150,000 troops over 
the next year
Joint United States-South Vietnamese invasion 
of Cambodia; massive protest in the United 
States
South Vietnamese troops, with United States 
support, invade Laos
Trial and conviction of Lt. Calley for mass 
murder at Mylai
New York Times begins its controversial 
publication of the "Pentagon Papers"
(TABLE 1 CONTINUED)
10/71 Reelection of Thieu
12/71 Series of bombing raids on North Vietnam
Source: John E. HueHer, War. Presidents, and Public 
Opinion (New York: Wiley, 1973) 29-32.
25
influence of clear and eaaily identifiable public opinion. 
On the other hand, the laat three eventa provide inatancea 
in which aoae factor appeara to have affected (perhapa even 
to have created) public opinion itaelf.
THE GOVERNMENT ACTS:
A. Early Aid - 25 October 1954
By 1954, the Korean conflict waa over. However, 
indigenoua coaauniat forcea were active in foraer French 
Indochina. Shortly after the partition of Vietnaa by the 
Geneva accords, rebel activity in South Vietnaa began to 
increaae. Since France waa in no poaition to fortify the 
new South Vietnaaeae government, Eiaenhower decided the US 
had no choice but to fill the void. Aaerican aid to 
anti-coaauniat forcea in South Vietnaa actually began long 
before ground forcea becaae involved. It waa no aecret 
that Washington had been aiding the French for years in 
their efforts to keep the colony out of coaauniat hands.
The deciaion to offer material aid the South 
Vietnaaeae had the support of a significant aegaent of the 
Aaerican people. In early May 1953, of those who knew of 
the Indochina conflict <71* total), 56* said the US should 
aend "war aateriala to help the French there."1 However, 
the public waa strongly againat the idea of sending US 
ground forcea. Of that same group who knew of the 
conflict, 78* aaid the US should not "aend aoldiera to take 
part in the fighting."® Table 2 presents evidence of the
TABLE 2
ATTITUDES TOWARD SENDING GROUND TROOPS TO VIETNAM
Date Disapprove Approve No Opinion
The United States is now sending war materials to help the 
French fight the Communists in Indochina. Would you 
approve or disapprove of sending United States soldiers to 
take part in the fighting there?
d/15/53 85 8 7
5/2/54 68 22 10
5/21/54 72 20 8
Source: American Institute of Public Opinion, The Gallup 
Poll: Public Opinion 1935 - 1971. gen. ed. William P. 
Hanson and Fred L. Israel, vol. 2 (New York: Random, 
1972) 1170, 1235, 1243.
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continued popular opposition to plana to aend ground forcea 
to Vietnaa. In Auguat of 1953, and in two separate 
occasions in May of 1954, 85X, 68*, and 72* of respondents 
stated that they would not approve of sending ground forces 
to Vietnam.
The Eisenhower administration waa not ignorant of thia 
fact. In the early months of 1954, as the government 
continued to send military aid to the French, Eisenhower 
went to lengtha to make sure the public understood that he 
did not intend to aend ground forcea to Vietnam to take 
part in the ground action. For example, in a news 
conference in February, Eisenhower claimed that the US 
getting involved in another war would be a mistake and that 
"everything he did waa calculated to prevent this from 
happening."3 He alao promised in another news conference a 
month later "that he would not involve the United States in 
any conflict, including Indochina, without first seeking a 
Congressional declaration of war."4 Such blanket, 
preemptive policy statements are not normally made from the 
White House, but Eisenhower apparently feared that public 
opinion would not tolerate another large scale war so soon 
after Korea. Conaequently, US troop strength in Vietnam 
during the Eiaenhower administration averaged only 650 per 
year.a
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B. The Buildup - 28 July 1965
According to Table 1, the aecond major escalation of 
the war in Vietnam occurred in 1965 when Johnson announced 
a draft call to allow an increase in troop strength to 
125,008. The war effort was not progressing well--the 
Pentagon needed more manpower to "finish" the job. This 
buildup reaffirmed US commitment to the South Vietnamese 
government and the continuation of the presence of American 
forces in Vietnam.
As was the case with Eisenhower's offer of aid, this 
too conformed to public attitudes about the war. The level 
of support that existed for the ongoing war effort is 
indicated in responses to the question "Should the United 
States continue its present efforts in South Vietnam, or 
should we pull our forces out?" in early and late February 
of 1965 in which, respectively, 64* and 66* of the total 
population favored continuing US involvement•* In 
addition, Table 3 indicates that, from January to October 
1965, a solid majority believed that the war was not a 
mistake. In January 50* of those polled believed the war 
was not a mistake and by October that percentage had risen 
to 64*. It was, therefore, entirely reasonable to assume 
that the public would approve of an increased US presence 
in the region. In support of this. Table 3 indicates that 
shortly after the announcement of the increased draft call.
TABLE 3
ATTITUDES TOWARD VIETNAM WAR AND 
PRESIDENTS JOHNSON AND NIXON
Mistake? Johnson Johnson Nixon in Nixon
Date (No) in Vietnam Approval Vietnam Approval
1/65 50% 71*
4/65 52 67
5/65 64
6/65 70
7/65 65
d/65 61
9/65 58 63
10/65 64
11/65 66
12/65 56 62
1/66 59
2/66 50 61
3/66 59 54 58
5/66 49 47 54
7/66 56
8/66 43 51
9/66 49 43 48
11/66 51 43 48
1/67 46
2/67 52
4/67 50 43 48
6/67 52
7/67 48 33
8/67 40
10/67 44 38
11/67 41
12/67 46 39 46
1/68 48
2/68 41 35 41
3/68 26 36
4/68 40 49
8/68 35 35
9/68 42
10/68 37
11/68 43
1/69 39 49 59
2/69 39 61
(TABLE 3 CONTINUED)
3/69 44 65
4/69 44 61
5/69 48 64
6/69 63
7/69 53 65
8/69 62
9/69 32 52
18/69 58 57
11/69 64 68
1/70 33 65 61
2/70 66
3/70 32 48 53
4/70 34
5/70 36 57
7/70 61
8/70 55
9/70 56
11/70 57
12/70 52
1/71 31
2/71 41 51
3/71 50
4/71 50
5/71 28
6/71 48
10/71 54
11/71 49
12/71 49
Source: Aaerican Inatitute of Public ODinion. The GalluD
Poll: Public Ooinion 1935 - 1971. aen. ed. William P.
Hanaon and Fred L. Iarael, vola. 2 & 3 (New York: !Randoa
1972); American Inatitute of Public ODinion. The GalluD
Poll: Public ODinion 1972 - 1977. aen. ed. William P.
Hanaon and Fred L. Iarael, vola. 1 & 2 (Wilmington 99
Scholarly Reaourcea, 1978); Gallup Opinion Index and 
Survey Reaearch Center (U of Michigan, Ann Arbor) qtd. 
in John E. Mueller, War. Prealdenta. and Public Opinion 
(New York: Wiley, 1973) 54-55.
(TABLE 3 CONTINUED)
Mistake? - Some people think we should not have become 
involved with our military forcea in Southeast Asia, while 
others think we should have. What is your opinion? or In 
view of the developments aince we entered the fighting in 
Vietnam, do you think the United States made a mistake 
sending troopa to fight in Vietnam?
In Vietnam - Do you approve or disapprove of the way the 
(Johnson Administration) (President Johnson) (President 
Nixon) is handling the (Vietnam situation) (situation in 
Vietnam)?
Approval - Do you approve or disapprove of the way (Lyndon 
Johnson) (Richard Nixon) is handling his job as president?
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58* aaid they approved of the way in which the Johnaon 
administration waa handling the aituation.
C. Withdrawal - 8 June, 16 Sept., 15 Dec. 1969
Support for the war, however, did not laat forever.
Aa the war progreaaed over the yeara, public opinion turned 
againat the continuation of the war. Table 3 ahowa that by 
March of 1968 (the month Johnaon announced that he would 
not run for reelection), only 26* of the population 
approved of the way he waa conducting the war. In 
addition. Table 4 clearly demonatratea that by 1969, a 
large aegment of the public had come to favor the 
commencement of a gradual withdrawal of US forcea from 
Vietnam. In December of 1968, 46* of the sample favored 
turning over responsibility for the fighting to the South 
Vietnamese, and, in January and May of 1969, 57* and 59* 
felt that the US ahould immediately begin a phaaed 
withdrawal. The public mood waa summed up by Theodore H.
White: The American appetite for war had long aince been
aated in Vietnam. From faculty club to student union, from 
bar to parlor, from Wall Street to Main Street, all wanted 
out of Vietnam.7
Nixon believed in 1968 that the iaaue of primary
importance to the voters was the ending of the war.® Nixon
recognized this aa a real political opportunity and, 
therefore, incorporated into his campaign platform a call 
for the rapid conclusion of the war. The implementation of
TABLE 4
ATTITUDES TOWARD TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM VIETNAM
Date Agree/Yes Disagree/No No Opinion
Some people say that the United States should continue to 
aend military supplies to South Vietnam but that we should 
let them take over the fighting and make all the decisions 
about peace and dealings with the Vietcong. Do you agree 
or disagree?
12/5/68 46 44 10
Some people think the time has come to begin to reduce 
month by month the number of United States soldiers in 
Vietnam. How do you feel*-do you think the time has come 
to do this?
1/1/69 57 28 15
5/22/69 59 25 16
Source: American Institute of Public Opinion, The Gallup 
Poll: Public Opinion 1935 - 1971. gen. ed. William P. 
Hanson and Fred L. Israel, vol. 3 (New York: Random, 
1972) 2172, 2179, 2199.
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this policy began to have its first concrete iapact when,
after winning the election, Nixon authorized three
withdrawals in aid and late 1969. His goal was ('to phase
out American forcea slowly enough not to jeopardize the
battlefield situation but fast enough to assuage American
political opinion."9 He ordered the withdrawal of first
25,099; then 35,000; and finally 50,000 troops--thus
beginning the gradual process of turning over the main
responsibility for fighting the war to the South
Vietnamese. In return for keeping his campaign promise and
ordering the withdrawals, Nixon waa duly rewarded. Aa
indicated in Table 3, public opinion of Nixon's handling of
the war improved greatly. Later, Nixon continued this
policy with additional withdrawals.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDS:
A. Senate Hearings - February 1966
In his book on the media coverage of the Vietnam war,
Hallin states:
Beginning with the live coverage of parts of the 
Fulbright Committee hearings in February 1966, 
dissent became a regular feature of television 
coverage. . . . The Fulbright hearings pushed 
the war at least partly into the Sphere of 
Legitimate Controversy. • . .*-*
These hearings were a public attempt to determine the
merits of the Johnson administration's handling of the war.
Really, for the first time, "J. William Fulbright, chairman
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and at one time
the president's key Capital Hill supporter on foreign
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policy, went public with hia opposition to U.S. policy in 
Vietnam. • . ."11 In effect, the public learned, beyond 
all doubt, that its government waa not of one mind on the 
iaaue of what to do in Vietnam.
Such public diacuaaion of US policy had an impact. 
Table 3 indicatea that the hearing occurred toward the 
beginning of a substantial slide in public perceptions of 
the Johnaon adminiatration, hia handling of the war, and in 
overall aupport for the war. In February of 1966, 50% of 
the public approved of Johnaon'a performance in Vietnam,
61% gave Johnaon a positive overall job performance rating, 
and, in March of 1966, 59% felt that US involvement in 
Vietnam waa not a mistake. However, by November of that 
aame year, those percentages had fallen to 43%, 46%, and 
51% respectively.
B. The Tet Offensive - 30 January 1966
The Tet offensive waa an unexpected campaign that 
caught the public's eye. During a religious aeaaon in 
Vietnam, the North Vietnamese army in cooperation with the 
National Liberation Front, attacked South Vietnamese and US 
positions in several separate actions involving “a wide 
range of powerful, simultaneous attacks against dozens of 
key cities and t o w n s . T h e  offensive demonstrated that 
the US was not even close to the victory the administration 
and the military had been asserting would come before long. 
A former military intelligence officer who served in
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Vietnam during the war told the author that, though the 
offensive waa a military disaster for the North Vietnamese, 
it crippled the US war effort by solidifying public opinion 
against the war. In agreement with this assessment, 
Townsend Hoopes, then Under Secretary of the Air Force, 
later wrote:
I am sure . . .  an attempt to carry on in Vietnam 
without significant change, as though the Tet 
offensive had not really happened, would have 
generated a wholesale domestic cataclysm, as well 
as a major explosion in the Democratic party, 
which neither Lyndon Johnson nor his Vietnam 
policy could have survived.13
It is not entirely clear exactly how this 
radicalization of public opinion occurred. Regardless, 
Table 3 indicates that the offensive did mark a sharp drop 
in Johnson's approval rating and estimates of his 
management of the war. In December of 1967, 46* of the 
sample approved of Johnson's job performance and 39* 
approved of his management of the situation in Vietnam.
But by March of 1966, both percentages had dropped, 
respectively, to 36* and 26*. Table 3 also indicates that 
the offensive marked the end of a short term leveling off 
of public support for the war and the continuation of the 
former decline in support. From July to December 1967, the 
percentage of those that believed the war was not a mistake 
bounced between 44* and 48*. However, seven months after 
the Tet offensive, in August of 1966, only 35* of those 
polled held that same position.
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C. The Invasion of Cambodia - May 1970
The invasion of Cambodia also had an unmistakable
imapct on public opinion. The goal of the administration
in this invasion was to eliminate enemy supply depots and
strategic forward bases that had previously been
"protected" by Cambodian neutrality. In return for being
left alone (so to apeak), the Cambodian government of
Prince Norodom Sihanouk had ignored the communist presence
on its territory bordering South Vietnam. The US had for
years wanted to directly strike at these bases. Nixon
also, according to Peter A. Poole,
had been anxious, since the start of 1970, to 
find a way of showing Communist leaders around 
the world that hia hands were not tied by 
anti-war opinion in the United States and that he 
was able to meet force with force when 
necessary.14
In May, he finally found his chance. It is interesting to
note, however, that this expansion of the war occurred at
the same time the US waa in the process of reducing its
presence in Vietnam.
The decision to invade Cambodia produced an impressive
response from the public:
Meetings and demonstrations protesting the 
incursion took place in towns and cities across 
the United States. . . . Congressmen found their 
offices jammed with students, lawyers, veterans, 
and other groups urging them to reverse the 
President's decision by legislative action.&s
In addition. Table 3 shows that May was the last month of a
small increase in public support for the war and the
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beginning of a decline in support, of 8 percentage points 
one year later. This loveient apparently reflected the 
public's growing disaffection with the war even with US 
involvement at lower levels. The decline in support, 
however, was not aa drasatic as sight be expected. As 
such, it say well have been sore of a reinforcesent of past 
trends than a new developsent.
THE ROLE OF MEDIA:
Finally, in an attespt to discover the source of 
public opinion, it only resains to be seen how these events 
were represented in the popular sedia. It is isportant, 
for this purpose, to select channels of cossunication which 
were utilized by significant elesents of the general public 
and opinion leaders. With this in sind, Newsweek, New 
Republic, and Tise were selected. All articles on Aserican 
participation in Vietnas in these three popular 
newssagazines for a period of three sonths before or after 
each event were exasined (logically, based upon whether the 
events were ones in which the governsent acted in the 
context of identifiable public opinion--the first three--or 
whether the event had an ispact on public opinion--the last 
three). A list of these articles is presented in Table S.
Then five questions were used to classify the articles and
\
their stand on war policy at that tine. The resulting data 
on the media's reporting of the war is presented in Tables 
6 through 11.
TABLE 5
PRINT MEDIA SURVEY--ARTICLES
EVENT NEWSWEEK NEWI REPUBLIC TIME
Aid Offer 19 Jl: 28+ 26 Jl: 6-7 19 Jl: 22
26 J1S 17-18 2 Aug: 7-8 19 J1S 23
26 Jl: 28 16 Aug: 16 26 Jl: 16
2 ,Aug: IS 2 Aug: 16-18
2 ■Aug: 20 2 Aug: 18+
2 ,Aug: 30+ 2 Aug: 19
2 Aug: 43 2 Aug: 20+
23 Aug : 38+ 2 Aug: 23
9 Aug: 28
23 Aug: 32
Johnaon 3 iMy: 23-25 24 Ap: 7 30 Ap: 30-31
Buildup 16 My: 49-50 19 Je: 5-6 7 My: 23-24
28 Je: 20-21 28 My: 21-22
5 ,Jl: 30-32+ 18 Je: 19
5 .Jl: 33 25 Je: 25
19 Jl: 15 2 Jl: 13-14
19 Jl: 17-18 2 Jl: 14-15
26 Jl: 19-21 23 Jl: 15-16
30 Jl: 9-10
Withdrawal 10 Mr: 112 15 Mr: 1 + 21 Mr: 13-14
Announcement 31 Mr: 20-22 22 Mr: 5-7
7 Ap: 28-30
5 My: 58
2 Ja: 44
Senate 14 Feb : 15 26 Feb: 8 18 Feb : 20
Hearinga 14 Feb : 33 26 Feb: 19-30 4 Mr: 26
21 Feb : 23 5 Mr: 5-7 18 Mr: 27
21 Feb : 24-27 28 My: 12-16 29 Ap: 26
21 Feb : 28-29 20 My: 27-28
28 Feb : 17-18
28 Feb : 19-20
28 Feb : 32
7 Mr: 23, 25-26
7 Mr: 25-26
14 Mr: 26-27
14 Mr: 38
(TABLE 5 CONTINUED)
Tet
Offensive
Cambodian
Invasion
19 Feb : 21 23 Mr: 6 15 Mr: 13-14
11 Mr: 25 23 Mr: 8-9
18 Mr: 39-40
18 Mr: 45
29 Ap: 20
4 My: 21-22 9 My: <9-10 11 My: 10-15
11 My: 22-26+ 16 My: 1 + 18 My: 22+
11 My: 54 16 My: 11-13 18 My: 24+
11 My: 112 23 My: 5-6 25 My: 28-34
18 My: 35-36 23 My: 15-18 1 Je: 21-22+
18 My: 36+ 30 My: 5-6 8 Je: 21
18 My: 49+ 6 Je: 5 6 Jl: 16-17
18 My: 57-58 13 Je: 5-6 6 Jl: 24
25 My: 31-32 11 Jl: 7-9 13 Jl: 6-8
25 My: 29-31
25 My: 43-45
25 My: 120
1 Je: 33-34
1 Je: 78
1 Je: 106
IS Je: 29-30
6 Jl: 88
13 Jl: 16-22
13 Jl: 23-24+
17 Aug : 36
TABLE 6
PRINT MEDIA SURVEY--AID OFFER 
(JULY-OCTOBER 1954)
Variable ♦ (Neutral) -
A 7 14
B 7
E 6 14 1 ‘
Variable A: Does the article mention the event or the 
policy option?
Variable B: Doea the article aupport the policy option?
Variable E: Doea the article approve of the preaident'a 
handling of the situation?
TABLE 7
PRINT MEDIA SURVEY--JOHNSON BUILDUP 
(APRIL-JULY 1965)
Variable ♦ (Neutral) -
A 11 8
B 6 5
C 10 7 2
D 7 10 2
E 8 9 2
Variable C: Doea the article support the continuation of 
the war?
Variable D: Does the article agree with the president's 
rationale for the war at the current stage?
TABLE 8
PRINT MEDIA SURVEY~ 
(MARCH
WITHDRAWAL ANNOUNCEMENTS 
-JUNE 1969)
Variable ♦ (Neutral)
A 8
B 6 2
C 3 5
D 3 5
E 3 5
TABLE 9
PRINT MEDIA SURVEY--SENATE HEARINGS 
(FEBRUARY-MAY 1966)
Variable ♦ (Neutral) -
A 12 12
C 7 14 3
D 5 14 5
E S 11 8
TABLE 10
PRINT MEDIA SURVEY— TET OFFENSIVE 
<FEBRUARY-MAY 1968)
Variable ♦ (Neutral)
A 5 3
C 5 3
D 7 1
E 1 4  3
TABLE 11
PRINT MEDIA SURVEY--CAMBODIAN INVASION 
(MAY-AUGUST 1970)
Variable (Neutral) -
A 39
B 4 24 11
C 1 21 17
D 2 37
E 3 20 16
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Tables 6 through S demonstrate that the media, as 
public opinion (as examined above), supported each of the 
options that were eventually selected. For instance, in 
each of these three events (Eisenhower's aid offer, 
Johnson's buildup, and Nixon's withdrawals), not a single 
article opposed the eventually selected policy option and a 
majority of articles (overwhelmingly except in the case of 
the buildup) favored the option. In addition, virtually 
all of the articles, in all three events, approved of or 
were neutral toward the president's handling of the 
situation.
Tables 9 through 11 also demonstrate that the media's 
reporting mirrored the downward movement in support for the
war found in public opinion (as examined above), though the
media seems to have taken a somewhat more neutral rather 
than negative stance toward the war after the selected 
events. For example, after the Senate hearings; Tet 
offensive; and Cambodian invasion; the articles were 
recorded as (toward the continuation of the war) 7 
positive, 14 neutral, and 3 negative; 0 positive, 5 
neutral, and 3 negative; and 1 positive, 21 neutral and 17
negative, respectively. At the very least, the tables
indicate that public opinion did reflect the media's 
reporting of the war.
Tables 9 through 11, however, also indicate that 
presidential interpretations of events were not always
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respected. In ell three cases, the media (while not 
directly contradicting the president) was clearly not 
persuaded to accept the president's explanations. The most 
extreme case is the Cambodian invasion after which only 2 
articles were recorded as supporting the president's 
rationale for the war at the current stage and 37 were 
found to be neutral. It would seem, then, that 
presidential leadership in the editorial pages was not 
accepted by the media during the entire war.
Now that the six selected events and how they were 
represented in the media have been examined in detail, it 
is possible to attempt to use the three paradigms and 
Hailin'a hypothesis to explain how public opinion affected 
the conduct of the Vietnam war and to discover the source 
of public opinion during the conflict. This task is 
accomplished in the third chapter.
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CHAPTER III 
THE RESULTS
Chapter I explored the queation of the causes of war, 
established the importance of the role of public opinion in 
this question, and explained three paradigms which explain 
how public opinion can influence the conduct of war and an 
hypothesis on the source of public opinion. Chapter II 
pictured in detail six events in the Vietnam war, their 
relationships to public opinion, and how they were handled 
by the media. All that remains is to see if the models and 
hypothesis can explain the data.
THE GOVERNMENT ACTS:
A. Early Aid - 25 October 1954
The facts of this event can be most clearly explained 
by using the constraint model. In the constraint model, 
public opinion acts as an anchor holding back the ship of 
state. In effect, public preferences prevent the 
government from selecting specific policy alternatives: 
actions are not changed in any way but simply made 
impossible or extremely difficult.
As explained before, immediately prior to the aid 
offer the public favored sending military supplies to South 
Vietnam, but it unambiguously opposed the idea of sending
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ground forcea. The Elsenhower adsinet.rat.ion knew this and 
made efforts to avoid arousing the wrath of the public by
announcing that there were no plans to send ground forces
to take part in the fighting any tise soon. Therefore, 
only material and economic aid, and no troops, were sent.
In effect, public opinion held Eisenhower back from 
selecting and implementing a policy similar to that which 
had earlier been used in Korea.
B. The Buildup - 2d July 1965
While public opinion clearly constrained Eisenhower, 
it served as an enabling condition for Johnson when he 
issued the draft call. In the enabling condition model, 
public opinion simply makes action possible--as the soil 
makes possible the growth of a plant. Public opinion makes 
the implementation of an action possible by placing it in 
the range of acceptable alternatives, but it does not 
directly support any particular policy.
As demonstrated in the second chapter, at the time of
the draft call and before, public support for the war
effort was relatively high. In fact, overall public
support for American involvement was at some of the highest
levels reached during the entire conflict. Because of this
broad based support for the war effort, a draft call to
increase force levels in South Vietnam became a viable
alternative (even though the public, of course, may not 
*
have been excited about the idea). As a result, Johnson
52
was able to give the military the troops he felt it needed 
to complete its assigned task.
C. Withdrawal - 8 June, 16 Sept., 15 Dec. 1969
Nixon's series of three withdrawal orders provides an 
excellent example of public opinion acting as a force. In 
the force model, public opinion is pictured as acting in 
the fashion of a billiard ball. Public opinion appears in 
the political environment and smashes into existing 
government policy and alters it--as one ball hits another 
and changes its direction of motion.
In this case, public opinion pushed the government 
toward a particular policy option. The public, by 1969, 
was rather displeased with the continuation of the war and 
Nixon recognized this. By ordering the withdrawals, then, 
Nixon was merely following the lead of public opinion. He 
was elected in part by promising to end the war quickly, 
kept his word by immediately ordering phased withdrawals 
after election, and was rewarded in the opnion polls after 
doing so.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDS:
A. Senate Hearings - February 1966
The data produced by the Senate hearings is not 
explained by the three models well at all. In this event 
an action occurred (the Senate hearings) and then a force 
was reduced (support for the war). As such, public 
opinion's role in the event was entirely reactive; it
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neither forced, made possible, nor conatrained anything. 
Rather, public opinion waa left without direction. The 
event waa characterized more by an eroaion of force than 
anything elae.
B. The Tet Offensive - 30 January 1968
At firat glance, the Tet offensive alao doea not seem 
to fit well into any of the aodela. However, on cloaer 
examination it does seem to fill a gap in the force model. 
In the force model, public opinion altera government 
policy. But thia public opinion must have a source. As 
pointed out earlier, the Tet offensive marked a significant 
decline in support for the continuation of the war effort, 
for Johnson's handling of the conflict, and for Johnson's 
overall job approval rating. These facts, combined with 
the domestic debate and general upheaval which Hoopes 
watched occur during the months of February and March, 
suggest that something happened in the event which caused 
the formation of a particular opinion in the public mind, 
the goal of which was to alter government policy.
If one assumes that the force of public opinion 
created by this event did alter policy in the long run, the 
Tet offensive can be used to enhance the explanative powers 
of the force model by identifying exactly where it was that 
the force originated in the first place. It also could be 
used to explain why the opinion against the war effort took 
the form and direction (which waa against the "more of the
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same" policy which had characterized Johnson's handling of 
the war) that it finally did. All of which may help the 
researcher discover the finer details of how the force of 
public opinion altered government policy by pointing out 
key areas of concern to the public. Regardless, the Tet 
offensive at least fits the force model to the degree that 
it helps explain the origins of certain aspects of public 
opinion.
C. The Invasion of Cambodia - Hay 1970
The facta of this event paint a similar picture to 
that produced by an examination of the Tet offensive. An 
event occurred in the conflict which apparently produced a 
negative reaction in public opinion toward the continuation 
of the war. In this case, however, the second chapter 
points out that the ratings dropped a smaller point spread 
while the physical demonstrations of dissatisfaction were 
more graphic and widespread. Nevertheless, it seems that 
something in each event did produce a particular opinion in 
the collective mind of the public. If this is the case, 
the invasion of Cambodia can also be used to enhance the 
explanative powers of the force model (but only if one 
assumes that a policy waa later altered by this public 
opinion).
SUMMARY - QUESTION #1:
How did public opinion affect the US government's 
conduct of the Vietnam war?
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So far this analysis indicates that the impact of 
public opinion on the conduct of the Vietnam war was 
varied. No single paradigm explains all of the six events; 
in fact, the data produced by separate events is best 
explained by using different models. Therefore, this 
suggests that no single explanation of the impact of public 
opinion on the conduct of war may be capable of explaining 
every event. As a factor in the rational calculation to 
employ the power building tool of war, one is forced to 
agree with Silberner and conclude that public opinion has a 
varied impact depending upon the individual situation.
THE SOURCE OF PUBLIC OPINION:
The data presented in the second chapter on the six 
events and the media's reporting of these events provides 
some evidence to support Hailin's hypothesis. In seeking 
the source of public opinion in the Vietnam war, Hallin 
essentially claims that public opinion was created by the 
president when he sent clear messages through the media. 
Through such a connection, the president could have 
exercised a great deal of influence on public opinion. If 
this is correct, one would expect to find two properties 
evident in the relationships between the six policy events, 
public opinion, and the media's representation of these 
events: a strong correlation between public opinion and the 
media's representation of the events and a high level of 
agreement between the media's and the president's public
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interpretations of the events. It should also be the case 
that when no clear signal was sent fro* above, the media 
should have taken a less supportive stance of government 
actions.
In the results of the survey, it is apparent that 
public opinion and the media's reporting of the six events 
were in relative agreement. For example. Table 7 shows 
that Johnson's draft call in July of 1965 was supported as 
a policy option in 6 articles out of 11 (the other 5 being 
neutral) and Table 3 indicates that, in August and 
September of that same year, 61* of those polled said the 
Vietnam war was not a mistake and Johnson personally 
received a 63k approval rating. As time progressed, public 
opinion and the media kept relatively in step as they both 
turned progressively negative in their assessments of the 
merits of the war effort. During and after the Tet 
offensive, according to Table 10, 3 out of S articles did 
not favor the continuation of the conflict (the other 5 
were neutral) and Table 3 shows that, one month after the 
offensive, only 41k of the sample felt the war was not a 
mistake. Table 3 also points out that two months after the 
offensive only 26k approved of Johnson's handling of the 
Vietnam situation and 36k approved of Johnson's job 
performance. While the media appears to have been slightly 
more neutral in the end, the deterioration in support for 
the war is equally evident in both.
57
The aurveya alao indicate that the media did indeed 
tend to agree with the president's interpretation of eventa 
in the earlier atagea. However, that agreement turned more 
neutral aa the war progreaaed. For instance, Eisenhower's 
aid offer waa more than acceptable to the media. Aa 
demonatrated by Table 6, apparently the media atrongly 
aupported the idea aince all 7 articlea which mentioned the 
policy option aupported it. In the caae of the Cambodian 
invasion, however. Table 11 indicatea that only 2 out of 39 
articlea (the reat were neutral) agreed with Nixon'a 
rationale for the invaaion. Further, the table alao ahowa 
that only 1 article aupported the continuation of US 
involvement in Vietnam while 21 were neutral and 17 were 
clearly againat. Nixon waa definitely not able to lead the 
media in thia caae.
One apecific event, the Senate hearinga, alao aeema to 
provide data which Hallin'a hypotheaia can explain. Aa 
mentioned above, Hallin'a hypotheaia auggeata that when the 
preaident did not (or waa unable to) aend a clear meaaage, 
the media became a forum for public debate rather than a 
device which the government could utilize to manage the 
public'a perceptions. Thia apparently ia what happened 
after the hearinga. Table 9 demonstrates that after the 
hearinga, which by definition demonatrated to the public 
that the government waa unclear aa to the wiadom of ita 
current policies, the media assumed a more neutral atance
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toward the conflict and the president's justification of 
the war than was found in earlier events: 5 articles agreed 
with the president, 14 were neutral, and 5 others 
disagreed.
SUMMARY - QUESTION #2:
What was the source of public opinion regarding the 
Vietnam war?
The findings above indicate that Hallin'a hypothesis 
is in part born out by the facts of the histories of the 
six policy events. The data presented fits patterns that 
would be expected if Hallin is correct: a strong 
correlation between public opinion and the media's 
representation of the events and a high level of agreement 
between the media's and the president's interpretations of 
the events. However, the media only supported the 
president when expanding the conflict in the early stages 
of the war, not in latter events like the Cambodian 
invasion. This suggests that, even when the president sent 
a clear message, his hold on the media may not be have been 
as strong as Hallin claims. Therefore, there must be other 
variables which can create public opinion which Hallin did 
not include in his analysis. This is especially true since 
Hallin'a hypothesis is correct when it suggests that the 
media as a "tool of policy" broke down when the president 
failed to communicate his positions clearly.
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CONCLUSION:
These results demonstrate that the search for the 
causes of war Is far from complete. As yet, no one even 
has an adequate explanation for the role of public opinion 
in the conduct of war. Therefore, models of the evolution 
of the international system that rely on the warlike or 
peaceful tendencies of public opinion as an important 
factor must be cast in grave doubt.
These results alao suggest that public opinion is 
malleable. Essentially, the state can be conceived of as 
an agent in an environment. In this case, the environment 
consists of public opinion <in reality only one factor in 
the political environment). The state must move "through" 
public opinion as it acts, thus the environment can have an 
impact on the behavior of the actor. Public opinion can 
force certain actions, make other actions more difficult, 
and make still others possible. However, the state is not 
entirely at the mercy of public opinion for it can have an 
influence in its creation. The atate, through the media, 
may be able to create an acceptable environment of public 
opinion, but only in restricted circumstances.
In effect, then, public opinion is malleable--it can 
be formed within limits to allow certain actions that 
otherwise would be difficult if not impossible. From this 
perspective, public opinion is not really an ephemeral
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quantity floating out there in political apace, but an 
integral part of the political event itself.
And thia may have important implications for the 
future of armed conflict. If authoritarian regimes 
continue to fall and be replaced by representative 
democracies (as has been the case in the late 60's and 
early 90's), public opinion may become an even more 
critical factor in analyses of the international system, 
especially in regard to questions of war and peace. How 
well states are able'to mold their own public's opinions 
and the opinions of citizens of other states could become a 
truly vital component of power in the emerging political 
order•
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